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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No.

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

vs.

:

ARTHUR RIBE,

:
:
:

Defendant-Appellant.

Argument Priority
Classification Number

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal of a final Order of the Trial Court denying
Defendant's

Motion

to

Suppress

Evidence.

This

Court

has

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated,
(1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
POINT I
Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the police complied
with Section 77-23-10 by announcing their presence only?
POINT II
Did the Trial Court apply the appropriate legal standard in
determining whether the police had complied with Utah's statutory
knock and announce requirements?

POINT III
Did the Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[w]e review the Findings of Fact supporting a trial Court's
decision

on

standard",

a

Motion

to

Suppress

under

a

clearly

erroneous

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Ut. App. 1990), but

we reviewed the ultimate conclusions drawn from those findings as
a matter of law, under a correction of error standard, affording no
deference to the trial Court.
App.

1991).

M

State v. Taylor, 169 U.A.R. 62 (Ut.

In assessing the trial Court's legal

based upon its factual

conclusions

findings, we afford it no deference but

apply a 'correction of error' standard".

State v. Johnson, 771

P.2d 326, 327 (Ut. App. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following Constitutional and Statutory provisions which
are applicable to this Appeal are:
a.

Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

which reads in relevant part:
secure

in their

"The right of the people to be

persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized".
b.

Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution

provides in relevant part:

which

"The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
2

searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no Warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized".
c.

Section

77-23-10

Utah Code Annotated

which

reads

in

relevant part:
"When
a
search
warrant
has
been
authorizing entry into any building . . . the
officer executing the warrant may use such
force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority and
purpose, there is no response or he is not
admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) . . . the magistrate . . . directs
the officer need not give notice. . . ."
d.

The Fifth Amendment to the United

State

issued

Constitution

which reads in relevant part:
"No person shall be
deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process
of law; . . .".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was arraigned before the District Court on one
count of possession of controlled substance, marihuana, a Third
Degree Felony.

The Defendant entered a plea of Not Guilty to said

charge and filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence alleging

illegal

search and seizure.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence

was

Trial

denied

by

the

Court.

Defendant

then

entered

a

conditional plea of guilty, as charged, preserving his right to
Appellate review of the search and seizure issue.
ensued.

3

This Appeal

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
a.

On

March

19, 1991

police

officers

appeared

at

the

Defendant's home for the purpose of executing a standard search
warrant.
b.

(PHT 3: 7-19).
The officers did not have actual possession of the search

warrant when they arrived at the Defendant's home.
c.

(PHT 13: 17).

The officers exited their vehicles and proceeded in a

single file line down the sidewalk toward the Defendant's residence
until they felt that they had been observed by the Defendant, at
which

time

they

increased

their

speed

and went

Defendant, who was standing in his driveway.
d.

to secure

the

(PHT 13: 3-7).

As the officers approached the house one group went to

restrain the Defendant while another group approached the front
door of the house.
e.
arriving.
f.

A

(PHT 14: 4 ) .

detective

went

into

the

house

immediately

upon

(PHT 14: 14).
The time interval between arriving at the premises and

entering the home was "seconds". (PHT 16: 18).
g.

The officers did not knock before they entered the home.

(MTS 49,50) .
h.

The police never uttered the words search warrant.

(MTS

40: 16).
i.
need

only

The prosecution has taken the position that the police
announce

their

office,

i.e.

yell

"police".

The

prosecution has taken the position that there is no requirement
that the officers knock, announce, and allow for a reasonable time
4

for the occupants to voluntarily admit the officers.
j.

The detective opened the storm door of the home, stepped

into the doorway, saw the Defendant's
freeze!".

(MTS 43).

wife and

said, "police!

(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion to Suppress factual allegation number 5, see also MTS. 49
through 50).
k.

Evidence purporting to be marijuana was found inside the

1.

The search warrant relevant herein was not a "no knock"

home.

search warrant.
m.

The Trial Court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress on

or about September 23, 1991.
n.

Defendant entered a Conditional Guilty Plea on or about

February 7, 1992 thereby preserving his right to appeal the issue
of illegal search and seizure. (Plea Transcript).
o.

On or about

March

27, 1992

the Court

sentenced

the

Defendant to serve a term of 9 months in the Salt Lake County Jail
with credit for 7 days previously served.
p.

This Appeal ensued.

q.

Defendant

pled

guilty

to

violation

of

Title

58-37-

8(1)(A)(4) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), a Third Degree
Felony.
r.

The Defendant applied for a Certificate of Probable Cause
5

from the District Court raising the identical issue that Defendant
seeks to raise on appeal here.
s.

The District Court denied Defendant's Application for a

Certificate of Probable Cause holding the legal issue raised was
without merit.
t.

The police

officers anticipated

marijuana at the home of Defendant.
u.

(MTS. 44:9)

The Trial Court would not allow the Defendant to inquire

into the issue of exigent circumstances.
v.
Court.
w.
notice

finding 10 pounds of

(MTS. 3:16-5:25)

The prosecution acquiesced in said conduct by the Trial
(MTS. 3:16-5:25)
The Trial Court made the legal
[of

presence]

is

the

legal

conclusion that actual

requirement

[for

service?]

(Judge's ruling on Motion to Suppress, 9:10).
x.

The Trial Court made the legal conclusion that the door

was open, thereby obviating in part the knock requirement.

Id.

9:13.
y.

It is undisputed that the stormdoor was closed.

(MTS.

48:20-21, 49:11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The police in this matter executed a standard knock and

announce warrant in a "no knock" fashion in violation of Section
77-23-10(2).

The Magistrate did not authorize such an entry.
6

2.

The Court should have granted the Motion to Suppress.

3.

The Trial Court and prosecution cannot attempt to use

exigent circumstances as an exception to the knock and announce
requirement

due

to

the

fact

that

the

trial

Court,

with

the

acquiescence and perhaps even encouragement, of the prosecution,
refused to

permit

an

inquiry

by

the

Defendant

into

exigent

circumstances.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT WAS ILLEGAL
The Utah Legislature authorized Magistrates to issue warrants
authorizing

varying

degrees

of

police

power

with

respect

to

execution of search warrants.
For example, all warrants must be served in the daylight hours
unless a special finding justifying night time service is made by
the Magistrate.

77-23-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended).

As a general

rule, an officer may only enter an enclosure

without notice if the Magistrate makes a special finding regarding
destruction of evidence or threat of physical harm to the officer.
The

problem

of

police

executing

search

warrants

unauthorized manner is not new to common law legal systems.

7

in

an
In

Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 9, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.E. 1603) that court

"In all cases in which the King is a
party the sheriff (if the doors be not open)
may break the party's house, either to arrest
him, or to do execution of the King's process,
if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he
breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of
his coming, and to make the request to open
the doors." Taken in full from State v. Buck,
756 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1988).
The Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah
provide

for

freedom

from

unreasonable

searches.

The

Utah

Legislature has, through enactment of Section 77-23-10, provided
guidance

to the

police

authorities

regarding

what

constitutes

reasonableness regarding the execution of search warrants issued by
Magistrates.
Section

77-23-10

makes

specific

provision

for

those

circumstances under which the police can use force (breaking) to
enter into any . . . building.
Section 77-23-10
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building . . . the
officer executing the warrant may use such
force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority and
purpose, there is no response or he is not
admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) . . . the magistrate . . . directs
the officer need not give notice. . . ."
The courts have articulated several common sense reasons for
requiring the police when executing a "knock and announce" warrant
8

to give notice of their authority and purpose and requiring them to
wait a reasonable time before entering without consent.
The common sense reasons set forth by the courts are:
(1) Protection of the privacy interests of the citizenry;
(2) Prevention of violence and physical injury to the police
and the occupants; and
(3) Property damage prevention.
State v. Buck, 750 P.2d 700, 701, (Ut. 1988).
Several

of the

facts involved

special consideration by the court.

in this case

are worthy

of

These facts are:

The police did not have physical

possession of the search

warrant at the time of the execution of said warrant, having left
the warrant at the police station. While Utah has not ruled on the
issue of physical possession of an otherwise valid search warrant,
a review of the Federal authorities discloses that mere failure of
the police

to

have physical

possession

of an otherwise

warrant is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment.

valid
See

U.S. v. Cooper 421 F. Supp. 804 (1976 U.S.D.C. W.D. Tenn.) and U.S.
v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749 (1971 9th Cir.)
However, while mere failure to possess the warrant does not
appear

to

be

a

per

se

violation

of

the

Federal

or

State

Constitution, this Appellant takes the position that the failure to
possess the warrant, when combined with other relevant factors, can
9

make an otherwise reasonable search unreasonable.
The question must arise in the mind of anyone considering the
facts of this

case whether

the police would

have executed

the

"knock and announce" warrant in a "no knock" fashion if they had
had actual possession of the warrant and were able to refer to the
specific terms of the warrant.
While the police did in fact announce their authority, i.e.
"Stop, Ringo, police" the announcement

of

their

presence

only

satisfies one of the three statutory criteria set forth in Section
77-23-10(1).

In addition to announcing their authority, the police

must :
1.

Announce their purpose, e.g. "We're here to execute a

search warrant", and
2.

Wait a reasonable time for the occupant to voluntarily

admit the officer.
The record is replete with uncontroverted

testimony by the

police officers that the words "search warrant" were not uttered by
the police prior to entry.
While there is much case
reasonable waiting

period,

law regarding what

that issue

amounts to a

is not relevant

to this

inquiry for the reason that the officer's testimony that he entered
the home immediately (PHT 14:14).

Both the statute and the Utah

Supreme Court decision in State v. Buck, 750 P.2d 700, (Ut. 1988)
10

require that the police officers execute search warrants in a civil
and dignified manner

which is respectful

of the

rights of the

citizenry guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions.
It is clear from the facts that the police did not comply with
the terms set forth in Section 77-23-10.
did not

have

actual

possession

of

Furthermore, the police

the search warrant

herein,

leading to the inference that the mis-execution of this warrant is
directly traceable to the fact that the police did not have the
specific terms of the warrant in front of them at the time of the
execution of the search.
Reasonableness, for search and seizure purposes, is offended
when the executing officers failed to abide by the order of the
issuing magistrate and the legislature.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE
Since the officers1 no-knock entry violated knock and announce
rules, the most

appropriate

remedy

is

the suppression

evidence, United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d

of

the

198, 292 (10th Cir.

1980) .
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1988) supra, the Utah
Supreme Court

refused

to suppress

the evidence obtained

unauthorized no-knock entry and search.

in an

That case did not justify

suppression because the no-knock occurred when no one was on the
11

premises.

However, unlike Buck, this defendant was at home at the

time of the execution and entry.
In State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), the
court

stated

that

a violation

of

procedure to protect substantive

a statute which

establishes

rights cannot be dismissed

as

technical or minuscule and suppression of the evidence gained from
the challenged search is the is the appropriate remedy.
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue
in particular, some jurisdictions, including

the Tenth

Circuit

Court of Appeals, have held that no-knock statutes are clearly
grounded in the Fourth Amendment protections of the sanctity of the
home.

See, United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d

381 (10th Cir.

1986);

United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979);

cert, denied 441 U.S. 965, S.Ct. 2415, 60 L.Ed.2d

1071

(1079);

State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671 (Idaho 1978); People v. Gifford, 782
P.2d

795

(Colo. 1989);

People

v. Ramey,

16 Cal . 3d

263, 127

Cal.Rptr. 699, 545 P.2d 1333 (1976).
Other courts have not gone as far as a Fourth Amendment claim
but do state that a knock and announce violation is serious enough
that all evidence seized during the search must be suppressed,
Unites States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. amended on other
grounds, 1985); State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671 (Idaho 1978); Greven
v. Super. Ct. of County of Santa Clara, 71 Cal.2d 287, 78 Cal.Rptr.
12

504, 455 P.2d 432 (1969).
It is clear in the 10th Circuit that knock and announce rules
encompass substantive rights that rise to a constitutional level.
Utah Code Ann. Subsection 77-10-3 was enacted to protect those
rights.

According

to Rowe, violation of those

rights must be

remedied by suppression. (Taken in part from Brief of Robert Van
Sciver in case of State v. Thurman, Case No. 910494)
POINT III
THE PROSECUTION WAIVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE
THE ISSUE OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Defendant in this matter attempted, at the Motion to Suppress
Hearing, to inquire into the issue of exigent circumstances which
would justify a departure from the knock and announce requirements
of Section 77-23-10, Utah Code Annotated.
As is demonstrated

by a review of the Motion to

Suppress

transcript at 44:18-45:13, (partial copy attached hereto as Exhibit
No. 1) the Trial

Court would

not

allow the Defendant

to make

inquiry into the subject despite the fact that Defendant, through
counsel, voiced fears that the issue would be raised on appeal by
the prosecution.
The Trial

Court

refused to allow

an inquiry

into

exigent

circumstances.
At the Hearing where the Trial Court ruled on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress the evidence, the Trial Court recognized exigent
13

circumstances as a fallback position for the prosecution (TR. dated
September 6, 1991 4:6-5:25.), attached hereto as Exhibit No. 2.
The Trial Court, by refusing to allow Defendant to inquire
into

the issue

of

exigent

circumstances

has violated

the

due

process of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which guarantees a Hearing.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the record it is clear that the police did not
comply with the statutory requirements governing the execution of
a standard "knock and announce" search warrant.
this violation
suppressed.

by

the police

officers

As a result of

the evidence

should

be

Furthermore, the State should not be allowed to use

the doctrine of exigent circumstances to justify an exception to
the "knock and announce" requirement.
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for the following relief:
1.

For an Order ruling that the evidence should have been

suppressed as a matter of law;
2.

For an Order suppressing from use at trial the evidence

relevant herein;
3.

In

the

alternative,

should

the

Court

deem

exigent

circumstances relevant, for an Order remanding this matter for such
further proceedings as are just with regard to the issue of exigent
14

circumstances;
4.

For such other and further relief as is just and proper

under the circumstances.
DATED th is P 3 d a y

of April, 1992.

ROBERT BREEZE*
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I caused to be hand delivered four (4) copies of the
foregoing to:
R. Paul Van Dam
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
on this ^

day of April, 1992.
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15

I will let you explore it briefly, but based upon
the position the State is taking, I should say it doesn't
appear relevant.

Perhaps it leads to relevant damage. I

will let you pursue it.
Q

(By Mr. Breeze)

What was it that you anticipated

finding in the house?
A

Marijuana.

Q

And how much marijuana?

A

Ten pounds.

Q

And is there—how long have you worked in the

narcotics law enforcement?
A

In narcotics?

Q

Yes.

A

In narcotics, three years.

Q

And I assume you have had some training in

narcotics enforcement, haven't you?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

Are you aware of any method that's commonly

available out there in the world where ten pounds of
marijuana could be destroyed in less than five seconds?
MR. LEMCKE:
THE COURT:
this, Mr. Breeze?

Objection.

Relevance.

What is the purported relevance of

The State is not contending that they

had exigent circumstances which justified a no-knock
situation.

They're contending, as Mr. Lemcke has pointed

V> f" T '>"T •*£

44
COMPUTER-aTnpn crm»"~

AJ ^

i

out, and as I understand it, that it simply was not a
21

no-knock execution of a search warrant.

3

relevance of this?

4\

So what is the

MR. BREEZE: Well, I am just trying to preserve

a

the record, Your Honor, if this goes up on appeal.

And I

d

would just like—I mean if Your Honor doesn't want me to

7j

inquire further, I certainly won't, but I would like to
know if they—I mean they are claiming that they knocked
and announced, as required by law, but I don't think that

101

the facts show that.

111

appeal, and I just hate to have the Court find some type of

12

exigent circumstances—

13

MR. LEMCKE:

And, further, if it went up on

Your Honor, again, the objection was

14

to relevance of the particular question, which was not only

19

irrelevant but argumentative to the fact:

Id

any way in this world that ten pounds of marijuana can be

17

destroyed in five seconds?

18

here.

la
2u
21

THE COURT:

Do you know of

It does not go to the issues

The objection is sustained.

Next

question, Counsel.
Q

(By Mr. Breeze)

Did you have any knowledge or

22

information that at the time that you were going to execute

23

this search warrant that Mr. Ribe was the type of person

24

that would have weapons and be a threat, a deadly threat?

23

A

No, I did not.

45
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1

not let us do so because you stated that they weren't

2

claiming exigent circumstances, or in fact, what you

3

claimed was that they were claiming that this was not a

4

no-knock service, and that therefore we were not allowed

5

to

6

J

THE COURT:

Well, it seems to me, Mr. Breeze,

7

I that there are two things contended in Mr. Lemcke's memo,

8

I and he can certainly correct me if I'm wrong.

9

J it was not a no-knock situation, because the door was open.

One is that

10

It did not enable anyone to knock.

11

real requirement under the law is that the police announced

12

their presence, which was done.

13

And that further, the

But it's my further understanding that their

14

alternate, or subsidiary position is that exigent

15

circumstances may warrant a variation on a search warrant,

16

and that that was present, as well.

17

their position is that that's a fall-back position, as it

18

I were.

Therefore I think

And so to that extent I have considered it, it's

19

certainly reflected in the memo and in the testimony, as I

20

recall it, so if you wish to argue that, you certainly may.

21

MR. BREEZE:

The only thing I could say, Your

22

Honor, is that we wanted to inquire at the motion to

23

suppress hearing as to whether there were, in fact, exigent

24

circumstances.

25

that regard, and Your Honor would not let us do so, based

We attempted to question the officers in
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1

on the facts that you said that Mr., you would not let us

2

do that.

And you said, "Well, I guess Mr. Lemcke's

3

J objection goes to the fact that he is not contending there

4

I was a no-knock situation."

5

I that with you, and we were not allowed to even inquire into

6

J the question of exigent circumstances.

7

I

8

I Mr. Breeze, and again, I've reread the transcript, from not

9

J only my hearing, but the preliminary hearing, where I was

10

I not involved, and based upon the request of counsel, I've

11

I considered both testimony, that there certainly was

12

J testimony adduced by yourself, and also by Mr. Lemcke,

13

whether or not there were objections made as to what I

14

would characterize as exigent circumstances.

15
16

THE COURT:

All right.

Well my understanding,

So to the

J extent that you want to make an argument on that, or any
other point, this would be your opportunity to do so.

17
18

And Mr. Lemcke concurred in

MR. BREEZE:

Your Honor, what we would like to do

is if exigent circumstances is going to be a factor in your

19

I decision, then we feel that we're entitled to interrogate

20

J the officers to find out whether there was exigent

21

circumstances.

22

into that area, and Mr. Lemcke concurs in that, and we're

23

not even allowed to- -

24
25

I mean when we're told that we can't delve

THE COURT:
hearing.

There isn't going to be an additional

That's my ruling on that, Mr. Breeze.

This has

